In this paper we provide new evidence on the importance of the so-called small state advantage for the allocation of the US federal budget. We also provide a new interpretation of the available empirical evidence. Analyzing outlays for the period 1978-2002, we show that not only does the population size of a state matter, but so too does its dynamics. Once population scale and change e¤ects are separated, the impact of population size is substantially reduced, and population change turns out to be an important explanatory variable of current spending patterns. The impact of scale and change e¤ects varies substantially across spending programs. Small states enjoy an advantage in defense spending, whereas fast growing ones are penalized in grants allocations. Our results imply that the interests of the states are not easily aligned around their population size alone. The distortion associated with population dynamics is concentrated on federal grants where formulas play a substantial role in limiting budgetary adjustments. Hence, a large part of the inverse relationship between spending and population appears to be driven by mechanisms of budgetary inertia which are compatible with incrementalist theories of budget allocation.
Introduction
Empirical research on the geographic distribution of US federal spending shows quite convincingly that small states (in population terms) receive disproportionately more dollars per capita. Evidence of small state advantage is usually based on the correlation between federal spending (or some speci…c spending program) and a linear or non-linear function of state population. The most common explanatory variable used in the literature is senators per capita, since small state advantage is often interpreted as the consequence of Senate overrepresentation. Interpreting the correlation between senators per capita and spending, however, is problematic. In particular, it is not obvious that such correlation represents a causal e¤ect of Senate malapportionment on the allocation of federal spending. This point is very clearly spelled out by Wallis (2001) :
1 senators per capita is simply twice the inverse of the state population and the estimated negative relationship between spending per capita and population may be driven by other important factors such as economies of scale, 2 or the fact that several spending programs are directly tied to population levels.
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The use of panel data with state …xed e¤ects does not help to solve this problem: in longitudinal data it is di¢ cult to disentangle budgetary lags from changes in over-representation.
In other terms, as states grow in population, and therefore fall in terms of representation, they will also lose money per-capita unless the ‡ow of money automatically adjusts to population growth.
These problems can be overcome if an exogenous source of variation in malapportionment could be identi…ed, like in Elis et al. (2009) , which uses periodic reapportionments in the House, or in Ansolabehere et. al. (2002) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2008) , which exploit 1 "The variable 1/POP represents lots of things. Some, like state ‡ags per capita, have no meaning at all. You, the reader, may interpret 1/POP however you like. But one cannot escape the conclusion that it is a troubled proxy for political in ‡uence. (...) If a variable represents two potentially competing hypotheses simultaneously, that variable cannot discriminate between the two hypotheses." Wallis (2001), pag. 307. 2 See for example Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) . Wallis (1998) , analyzing New Deal spending allocation to the states, …nds that economies of scale (for example in the large projects for infractructure building) provide a very plausible explanation for the disproportionately large per capita spending received by small Western states, characterized by a small population dispersed over a large land area.
3 See for example Hoover and Pecorino (2005) and Levitt and Snyder (1995) .
court-ordered reapportionment of state legislatures. Unfortunately, in the case of the Senate, the only determinant of variation in malapportionment is population. Whereas studies that use narrowly de…ned spending programs can sometimes make a convincing case for the estimation of a malapportionment e¤ect, this is quite di¢ cult for broad spending aggregates. At the same time, studying the allocation of aggregate spending is important if we want to not only show that an e¤ect of malapportionment exists, but to also quantify its overall relevance for the federal budget. This is important because, as pointed out by Larcinese et al. (2006) , various and sometimes inevitable distortions introduced by di¤erent institutional arrangements may in fact o¤set each other, leaving a state without a real advantage in the overall budget allocation, even when an advantage can be found in some speci…c programs.
In this paper we show that, in spite of the di¢ culties we just mentioned, substantial progress can be made in the estimation of the so-called small state advantage in the allocation of large spending aggregates, whether that is due to malapportionment or to other scale e¤ects.
By revisiting the estimation methodology used by the existing literature, we provide new results that address this question more directly. First, we show that -while small states enjoy an advantage in the allocation of the federal budget -the estimated advantage is substantially smaller than in previous studies. Second, we …nd that states with fast growing population loose federal spending to the advantage of slow growing ones. This happens independently of whether they are large or small (in terms of population) and the e¤ect is concentrated on federal grants.
Our estimates, obtained using the standard …xed e¤ect speci…cation for the period 4 con…rm the existence of a strongly positive correlation between senators per capita and total federal outlays. We show, however, that this result is extremely non-robust to speci…cation changes and illustrate a number of rather puzzling …ndings that cast doubts on the prevalent interpretation of the available evidence. First, we show that the impact of senators per capita vanishes in pure cross-section regressions, i.e. when state …xed e¤ects are omitted.
Second, we …nd that the e¤ect of overrepresentation is particularly strong on aggregates 4 This represents the longest timespan ever considered in the literature.
3 such as direct payments to individuals, 5 while we do not …nd any signi…cant e¤ect on defense spending. This would imply the hardly justi…able claim that direct payments to individuals are somehow more prone to geographic manipulation and targeting than defense spending. Third, if we omit senators per capita from our regressions and analyze the estimated …xed e¤ects (which should then contain the overrepresentation e¤ect) we discover that, after controlling for socio-demographic indicators, larger states often receive more funds than average.
The absence of any e¤ect in pure cross-section regressions may suggest that …xed e¤ects are crucial to correct potential omitted variable bias, and there is certainly no doubt that …xed e¤ects estimates must be preferred in this case. Nevertheless, the inclusion of …xed e¤ects implies that the coe¢ cient of senators per capita is estimated from within-state variation of state population. This point is particularly important because the coe¢ cient of senators per capita is instead used to assess spending di¤erentials between states and, as we will discuss in more detail below, this interpretation of the coe¢ cient con ‡ates two di¤erent e¤ects that should instead be kept separate: a scale e¤ect (in each given period states have di¤erent population size) and a change e¤ect (in each given state population changes over time The factors that can be responsible for this important distortion are numerous and can be traced back to the way the budget allocations are actually determined. First, reallocations of funds are limited by the lack of information available for the drafting of the yearly budget.
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For example, several programs rely on outdated census data to distribute funds across states. Our evidence is consistent with these mechanisms of budgetary inertia highlighted by policy practitioners, and con…rms the importance of formulas in the allocation of the budget. In particular, we show that fast growing states are especially penalized in the allocation of formula grants, whereas for non-formula programs the e¤ect of the population dynamics is substantially smaller and has modest statistical signi…cance. In theoretical terms, our results are compatible 6 Several pieces of legislation introduced in Congress between 1989 and 1993 by the representatives of Florida, Arizona and California point out that the budget allocation based on decennial census data penalizes fast growing states. (Fair share act of 1989 (Fair share act of , 1992 (Fair share act of and 1993 . Source: The library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/) 7 Fast growing states rank at the bottom in the allocation of transportation funds per capita in the stimulus package (The Wall Street Journal, Who gets what from the stimulus package, January 27, 2009).
8 As posited by a voluminous literature of behavioral "incrementalist"theories of budgeting originated with Wildavsky (1964) , the limited temporal, …nancial and cognitive resources available in each year do not allow a rigorous re-examination of the current budget which is then determined by marginal changes to past budgetary allocations. 9 For an o¢ cial report see "Federal Formula Programs: outdated population data used to allocate most funds" (GAO 1990 ).
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with behavioral "incrementalist" theories of budgeting (Wildavsky 1964) , which claim the current spending to be largely predetermined by past budget allocation.
Our analysis shows that the distinction between population size and growth is important.
Some small states grow very fast, some large states hardly grow. This complicates the negotiations over the budget since the size of the states does not provide a clear line along which coalitions can be formed. Population dynamics represents another important dimension along which the interests of the states may be aligned. Our …ndings suggest the existence of an important divide between fast and slow growing states, which is at least as important as the divide between small and large states and, for some spending programs, even more relevant.
Hence, the procedures that make public spending not su¢ ciently responsive to population changes are responsible for a substantial part of the distortions that are currently interpreted as a consequence of the size of the states alone.
Related literature
The literature on small state advantage consists mainly of studies of the consequences of Senate malapportionment. In a purely functionalist view, the double representation principle was devised by the founding fathers of the US constitution in order to balance the interests of the small and big states. The combination of proportional and equal representation, together with the House proposal power on budgetary matters, should grant adequate consideration to the interests of all states, independent of their population size. Ansolabehere et al. (2003) provide a formal model showing how the attribution of proposal power to the lower house may indeed counterbalance the malapportionment in the upper house leading to an equal distribution of per-capita government expenditure.
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The functionalist view has been increasingly challenged by recent research. Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) equate Senate apportionment to a "panda's thumb", the residual of a contingent historical situation: "the apportionment of the United States Senate did not result from the impartial application of any general principle -such as federalism or minority rights -was instead the outcome of a clash between contending political interests within a particular institutional and ideological context".
11 Evidence is now available about various types of distortions generated by the equal representation principle in American politics and policymaking. 12 Some of this literature has focussed on the consequences of malapportionment for the geographic distribution of federal spending, providing support for the idea that small states receive a disproportionate share of the federal budget. 13 The work of Atlas et al. (1995) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) ) and a broad range of spending aggregates, …nd that states'representation in the Senate is positively related with total per capita outlays as well as with procurement, grants, wages and pensions. 14 On the other hand, Levitt and Snyder (1995) …nd that districts from more populous states receive in fact more (rather than less) federal spending.
Another strand in the literature has focused on more speci…c spending aggregates where the impact of the Senate can be more precisely identi…ed. Lee (1998) , using Bickers and Stein (1991) data on domestic outlays from 1983 to 1990, …nds evidence of overspending in 11 Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) , p. 27. For a critical view of Senate representation in the US constitution see also Dahl (2002) .
12 Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) consider, among other variables, the number and quality of contacts between Senators and constituents, Senators'fund-rasing e¤orts and strategies, the competitiveness of the electoral race, the allocation of federal spending. They also …nd a counter-majoritarian tendency to favor the minority party (in popular vote terms) making it the majority party in Senate. Racial representation has also been shown to be substantially biased against African-Americans and Hispanics (Gri¢ n (2006); Malhotra and Raso (2007) ). 13 The actual process through which Senate overrepresentation could generate a bias in federal budget allocation might be related to congressional bargaining. Since less funds are necessary to obtain the same increase in percapita expenditure in a smaller than in a larger state, senators who need to build winning coalitions to bring federal spending to their constituents will typically ask smaller states to enter the coalition to minimize the cost of buying political allies. Various arguments grounded on this basic premise can be found in Lee (1998) , Knight (2004) , Knight (2008) and Dragu and Rodden (2010) .
14 They, however, …nd a negative impact of House representation.
small states for non-discretionary distributive programmes that are allocated via formulas determined by the Congress. Lee (2000) 15 There is some literature on the consequences of overrepresentation outside of the US context. Rodden (2002) provides evidence on the impact of the overrepresentation of small countries in the EU. He …nds that agricultural and regional development transfers as well as total net transfers are disproportionately allocated to small EU member states. See also Aksoy and Rodden (2009) for results on new EU member states. Evidence from Japan is provided in Yusaku and Saito (2003) , Shigeo (2006) and Shigeo and Ting (2008) . Pitlik, Schneider, and Strotman (2006) provide evidence from Germany. 16 The magnitudes reported by Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) are substantially smaller. They use seven years of data and a representation index with little within-state variation, which therefore does not allow the inclusion of state …xed e¤ects in the regressions. As we will see, including state …xed e¤ects makes a substantial di¤erence both in terms of the magnitude and signi…cance of the estimated coe¢ cients. Moreover, they focus on programmes that represent an overall 56% of the federal budget, hence the …nal magnitudes are necessarily smaller than those obtained by using total federal spending. 8 powerful than California as current empirical investigations seem to suggest? More generally, do small states enjoy such a disproportionate leverage in the allocation of the federal budget?
In the remainder of the paper we will address this important question.
Some puzzling results
Population size varies considerably across US states and so does per capita Senate representation. Table 1 Figure 1 , where the states are ordered along the horizontal axis according to their average population in the period considered, while on the vertical axis we report average per capita outlays. Figure 2 provides yet another visual representation of the spending-overrepresentation link. Although it is apparent that Midwest states tend to be, on average, both overrepresented and better funded, looking at the entire US map it becomes clear that this is far from being a general statement.
A well established procedure to assess the impact of Senate representation on the geographic allocation of the federal budget amounts to estimating the following equation: To interpret the coe¢ cients of equation equation (1), two remarks are in order. First, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable implies that the impact of the independent variables on spending is not transmitted in a single time period, but over a period of subsequent years.
The coe¢ cients of the regressors in equation (1) are short run multipliers, i.e. they capture the impact in a single time period. It is then possible to compute long run multipliers, that capture the cumulative e¤ects of the regressors over the years. This is done by dividing each short run multiplier by 1 minus the lag of the endogenous variable. 21 Hence, for example, the long run coe¢ cients for SP is given by (1 ) , and for N st is (1 ) . Second, since we adopt a functional form that includes both SP (a non-linear population term) and a linear population term, the marginal e¤ect of population (N st ) on real per capita spending (y st ) for the short run is given by
The corresponding long run coe¢ cient is
This implies that the scale e¤ect is non-linear and this must be taken into account while computing the size and signi…cance of the population's coe¢ cient. Hence, whenever both SP and a direct population term are included we also report the overall marginal e¤ect of 19 For a discussion of this point see Lee and Oppenheimer (1999), p. 172. 20 Including both a lagged dependent variable and state …xed e¤ects introduces a bias in the estimated coe¢ cients Nickell (1981) . This bias is declining in T (see Greene (2003) , p. 307) and Monte Carlo simulations tend to show that, for T > 20, while the bias in may remain sizeable, the bias in the other coe¢ cients becomes very small (Kiviet (1995) , Judson and Owen (1999) ). Moreover, the alternative IV estimates (see for example Arellano and Bond (1991) ) tend to be generally less e¢ cient. The time dimension in most of our regressions is equal to 25 and it is never inferior to 20, hence our choice of estimating equation (1) by OLS. 21 The formal derivation of the long run multipliers is reported in Appendix.
population evaluated at the average population value in our sample (both the short-run and long-run coe¢ cients).
We start by estimating equation (1) using Census data for the US States during period 1978-2002. 22 Summary statistics are reported in Table 2 and estimates in Table 3 . We start with a simple regression of real federal spending (outlays) per capita on senators per capita and then progressively include lagged spending, population, year dummies, socioeconomic control variables and, …nally, state …xed e¤ects. Only the introduction of …xed e¤ects renders statistically signi…cant the estimated coe¢ cient b . 23 The population e¤ect at the mean is instead statistically signi…cant when we introduce year …xed e¤ects (column 4) and remains so in the short run if socioeconomic control variables are introduced (column 5). In any event,
when we include state …xed e¤ects both the size and the magnitude of the overall impact of population are much larger. The short run coe¢ cient is around sixty times larger, the long run four times.
available from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. 25 We report speci…cations both with (Table 4a ) and without (Table 4b ) …xed e¤ects (but always including year dummies and socioeconomic control variables). Once again, introducing the state …xed e¤ects makes a big di¤erence for the sign and signi…cance of the SP coe¢ cient. In the speci…cation without …xed e¤ects, only for grants the coe¢ cient of senators per capita comes with the expected positive and signi…cant sign. In all other cases, the coe¢ cient is either insigni…cant, as in the case of direct payments to individuals and salaries, or it is statistically signi…cant but has the "wrong" negative sign, as in the case of defense spending. In any event, if we consider the overall impact of population on spending, the short-run coe¢ cient of direct payment is the only one to be signi…cant.
When state …xed e¤ects are introduced (Table 4b ), the impact of senators per capita becomes positive in all the equations and it is statistically signi…cant in the case of direct payments to individuals, salaries and grants. In this last case, the coe¢ cient has almost been doubled by the introduction of state …xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient of senators per capita is instead insigni…cant when we consider defense. 26 The overall negative impact of population is strong and statistically signi…cant for grants and salaries (both in the short and long run), and for direct payments to individuals (short run only). The impact of population is never signi…cant for defense. This, however, is a spending aggregate that is at least as likely to be subject to geographic manipulation as direct payments, salaries, and grants.
Finally, we estimate equation (1) without the SP indicator. In this case we expect the e¤ect of malapportionment to be incorporated in the state …xed e¤ects. Figure 3 plots the estimated …xed e¤ects versus the average state population (in the period considered). 27 The 25 The statistical abstract reports yearly outlays at state level by program (direct payments to individuals, salaries and grants) and by agency (defense and non defense). Procurement spending (for which large amounts of funds are appropriated to be spent over the course of many years ) is instead not recorded on an outlay basis. Therefore, a note of caution applies to defense spending for which it is not possible to isolate the pure outlays components from the long term investments (often decided far back in time) that display very limited yearly variation. 26 Our results are di¤erent from Atlas et al. (1995) Overall, these results provide a rather puzzling picture which -in light also of the large magnitude of the estimated e¤ects in speci…cations including …xed e¤ects -cast doubts about what exactly is estimated by using SP as an explanatory variable. Since the number of senators is …xed and equal to 2 for all states, the variable SP in equation (1) is simply a constant divided by the population. In other words, SP varies only because population varies. Interpreting the coe¢ cient of SP as the impact of malapportionment is not an obvious step. How much of the inverse relationship between SP and federal spending is due to malapportionment remains moot.
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terms is relatively stable over the period considered. 28 To make this point clearer it can be useful to rewrite the basic equation (1) making explicit how it depends on the population term. Omitting for simplicity the error term, the time dummies and the lags, equation (1) can be written as:
Where Y st is total federal spending in state s at time t, N st is total population, z st is a vector of control variables expressed in total per state (instead of per capita) levels. The overrepresentation indicator is given by 2 Nst . The above equation, with or without …xed e¤ects, cannot identify the impact of overrepresentation on spending per capita from that of any other e¤ect induced by population variation. In fact, if we multiply both sides of the equation by N st , we obtain:
In this equation, the e¤ect of overrepresentation on total spending ( Y st ) is captured by the constant term (2 ). Hence, any factor that induces a positive constant term in the total spending regression would be interpreted as overrepresentation in per capita spending equation. The factors that can possibly be captured by the constant term are very numerous and it is not obvious how to infer whether overrepresentation is the most important of them.
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4 Small state advantage, population dynamics and federal budget allocation
Having established that the impact of malapportionment cannot be identi…ed by estimating equation (1), even when …xed e¤ects are included, we now turn to a more general question about small state advantage. Admitting that we cannot identify the impact of malapportionment does not imply that no progress can be made to establish whether small states indeed receive more federal monies and, in case of an a¢ rmative answer, why. This leads us to another identi…cation problem. Population variation across states may induce variation in per capita federal spending via two main channels. First, states may receive di¤erent amounts of spending because they di¤er in their population sizes (scale e¤ect). Second, independently of their size, their spending allocation can vary because of pure population dynamics (change e¤ect).
Di¤erences in spending per capita due to the scale e¤ect may arise because states are di¤erently represented in the Senate, but also as a consequence of the possible economies of scale in the provision of goods and services in the most densely populated states. Isolating an overall scale e¤ect is important because it would give us an upper bound of the impact of malapportionment on spending. The problem, however, is that an inverse relationship between spending per capita and population can also be observed whenever, because of inertia, yearly changes in per capita spending do not exactly re ‡ect yearly changes in population. In this case, fast growing states, independently of their size, could see a decline of per capita spending because budgetary provisions do not adequately respond to population trends.
When using panel data the scale e¤ect and the change e¤ect -if nothing is done to isolate them -are con ‡ated into one single coe¢ cient. Given the puzzling results reported in the previous section, we have good reasons to think that at least some of the estimated population e¤ect is due to population dynamics rather than to the di¤erent population size of the states. States with a fast growing population may be disadvantaged in the distribution of federal funds since several factors contribute to generate inertia in the allocation of the federal budget.
First, as pointed out by incrementalist theories (Wildavsky (1964) ; Davis et al. (1966) ; Dempster and Wildavsky (1979) ), the complexity of the budget implies that new provisions are determined mainly by marginal changes to previous ones. Second, formulas play an important role in explaining budgetary inertia. For several programs, hold-harmless provisions guarantee that the funds allocated to a state will be no less than a speci…ed proportion of a previous year's funding.
29 If a population change results in a decrease in funding below a designated amount, the hold harmless provision would raise the amount to designated one. At the same time, the amount of the increase would be deducted from the funding of other states not a¤ected by the hold-harmless provision. In an analogous way, caps impose a limit on the size of an annual increase as a proportion of a previous year's funding so that, if a population change produces an increase in funding above a certain amount, the cap would limit its e¤ect. Floors and ceilings operate in a slightly di¤erent way, but have similar implications: if a change in population reduces funding below the ‡oor, a state would be guaranteed the amount speci…ed by the ‡oor, whereas if the allocation exceeds the ceiling, the state cannot receive more than the ceiling amount. 30 Finally, the use of outdated population data in formulas penalizes states whose population grows fast. 31 As we will see, the budgetary inertia introduced by 29 For example, a 100% hold-harmless provision is currently in place for the Title I education program and the WIC (Women, Infant and Children). For a detailed report on formula programs see CNSTAT (2003) . 30 For example, the Title I education program state expenditure per pupil is restricted to a range between 80% and 120% of the national average per pupil expenditure. In the special education program no children may receive more than 40% of the average per pupil expenditure in US public elementary and secondary school. Other important programs subject to limits are the Federal Highway Program and Medicaid. 31 In a testimony (26 February, 2008) For spending we construct a size invariant index by dividing the state per capita spending in each year by its value in 1978 (and multiplying the result by 100). We also construct an analogous index for the overall spending in the United States. The di¤erence between the state spending index and its corresponding US index will then describe the relative change of spending in a state compared to the US average. We then construct an analogous index for the population of each state by subtracting from our previously computed scale independent index of population its corresponding US index. fastest growing population in the US -the spending index is always below its 1978 level and continuously decreasing.
The next section con…rms the basic intuitions provided by this simple graphic by using regression analysis.
Estimating scale and change e¤ects
To separate the e¤ect due to change from the e¤ect due to scale we construct a scale independent index of population change (P OP IN D) that we will then introduce in our baseline It should be compared with Figure 2 , which reports the corresponding map for population and federal spending per capita. As we can see, the least populated states in the North-East seem to be advantaged in the allocation of federal spending if compared to populous states such as California, Texas and Florida. For these states we also have an inverse relationship between federal spending and P OP IN D. These states conform to an important claim made by Lee (1998) and Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) , that the large states are also those that grow faster and vice-versa: hence the small (and slow-growing) states often secure more funds by negotiating formulas that guarantee minimum allocations.
It is certainly true that, if one takes a very long term perspective on this matter, then the fast growing states will also tend to be larger, and states that do no grow will shrink in relative terms. The di¤erences in size between states, however, are so large that it would probably take many decades if not centuries to reach a good alignment between size and growth. In fact, over the period we consider (twenty …ve years), there is almost no switch in the ranking by size, despite the very marked di¤erences in population growth. Some small states -like Nevada and Utah -experience a very rapid population growth, whereas some large states like New York and Philadephia grow very little. This implies that when formulas are negotiated, the interests of the states are not easily aligned along the population size dimension and, in fact, if we look at the average spending distribution, states like Nevada and Utah seem to be disadvantaged if compared to states like New York and Pennsylvania no less than if compared to the small and static states of the North-East. If scale and change e¤ects went exactly in the same direction for all or most states, it would be hard to separate the two. We can separately estimate the scale and change e¤ects precisely because this is not the case.
We can use P OP IN D to purge our scale coe¢ cients of any e¤ect due purely to population change and therefore identify the scale e¤ect (which is an upper bound of over-representation).
Returning to equation (1), the new speci…cation becomes: The results reported in column 1 of Table 5 show that the scale-independent measure of population change is key to explain federal budget allocation to the states. 33 The coe¢ cient of P OP IN D is negative and signi…cant, implying that fast growing states are penalized in the allocation of the federal budget, independently of their population size. 34 On the other 33 An alternative estimation strategy consists of introducing state speci…c trends, t s , in our basic speci…cation. The results obtained with this alternative speci…cation mirror quite well those obtained with P OP IN D but have the disadvantage of not making explicit the source of the trends (results are available from the authors upon request). 34 As a further robustness check, we also introduced an interaction term between SP and P OP IN D. This hand, once we control for the scale independent population change, the coe¢ cient of senators per capita remains signi…cant, but its magnitude is reduced to about one half of the value estimated in column (6) of Table 3 . The same is true for the overall scale e¤ect, evaluated at the average population level, whose size is halved by the introduction of P OP IN D, both in the short and long run.
This analysis leads us to the following conclusions. First, states whose population grows faster are penalized in the budget allocation independently of whether they are large (and hence underrepresented in the Senate) or small (and hence overrepresented): this suggests that the budget fails to respond to population changes at an adequate pace. Second, the coe¢ cient of SP -as well as of the overall scale e¤ect -is reduced by half when change and scale e¤ects are separated. Con ‡ating these two coe¢ cients leads to a serious overestimation of the scale e¤ect and, therefore, of the upper bound of the potential impact of overrepresentation. It is, however, important to stress that our analysis con…rms the presence of a pure small state advantage (scale e¤ect) in the allocation of total federal spending.
Finally, the impact of P OP IN D on spending is of a realistic magnitude. For example, the estimates of 19 be related to the population size of the states.
5 Scale and change e¤ects in di¤erent spending categories: further evidence
Population change and scale e¤ects should play a di¤erent role in di¤erent spending programs.
For some spending categories, such as defense, there is no reason to expect population dynamics to play any particular role, whereas scale e¤ects might actually be quite important.
For formula programs, like many types of grants -where population is an important inputfast growing states might be severely penalized by formulas that impose restrictions on yearly funding changes, as well as by the use of outdated population data. This would not rule out possible scale e¤ects either due to economies of scale or to political pressures, since formulas can incorporate economies of scale and are, to a certain extent, manipulable too. The same can be said of public spending in salaries since public services and personnel may not grow at the same pace as the overall population growth and, at the same time, a small state advantage in this type of spending cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, there are no immediate reasons for direct payments to individuals to display any sort of small state advantage. In fact, as pointed out in Section 2, the negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient found for direct payments to individuals using the standard speci…cation (1) is particularly puzzling given the entitlement nature of the programs involved. Equally surprising is the absence of a signi…cant e¤ect on defense spending. When we add P OP IN D to the basic speci…cation we obtain very di¤erent results delivering a more plausible assessment of the advantage enjoyed by small states.
The estimated coe¢ cients, reported in columns 2-4 of Table 5 with columns 6-7-8 in Table 4b ), whereas the coe¢ cient of the linear population term is now negative and signi…cant for salaries only. Most importantly, the overall scale e¤ect does not display a signi…cant coe¢ cient neither in the short run nor in the long run in any of the speci…cations reported in column 2-4 of 20 Table 5 .
On the other hand, for defense spending (Table 5 , column 5), we …nd an overall negative and statistically signi…cant scale e¤ect, which becomes substantially larger and more signi…-cant in the long run. This result, which refers to an overall scale e¤ect and cannot therefore unambiguously be identi…ed as malapportionment, is nevertheless at least consistent with the idea that defense spending is prone to some manipulation in geographic terms. P OP IN D has a negative impact on direct payments to individuals, grants and salaries, but the statistical signi…cance is above the 10% threshold for grants only. On the other hand, as one would expect, population dynamics plays no signi…cant role in the defense equation. Finally, column 6 shows that the scale e¤ect found on total federal spending (column 1) is mostly due to defense. When we regress all non-defense spending on our explanatory variables, the scale e¤ect loses its statistical signi…cance both in the short and in the long run. The impact of P OP IN D becomes stronger instead both in magnitude and signi…cance.
Since formulas may play a crucial role in limiting the response of the budget to population changes, we conduct a further check using data on grants that allow us to distinguish between formula and non-formula programs. To this end, we have used the information provided by the Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) to identify the programs that are allocated by formula. Formula grants are de…ned in the CFDA as "allocations of money to States or their subdivisions in accordance with distribution formulas prescribed by law or administrative regulation, for activities of a continuing nature not con…ned to a speci…c project". Both formula and non-formula programs in the CFDA are identi…ed by the same codes used in the Consolidated Federal Fund Report (CFFR), which contains data on federal grants allocation to the states on an obligation base, starting from 1983. Hence, by matching the information from the CFDA with the spending data from the CFFR, we have classi…ed federal aid into two categories, formula and non-formula grants. With the exception of Wyoming -which receives on average (during the entire period) roughly equal amounts of formula and nonformula grants -the amount of funds allocated by formula is on average always larger than the non-formula for all states. In the period we analyze, slightly over 67% of federal aid is allocated via formulas. 35 This is not surprising given that formula programs include several large important items such as Medicaid, Title I education grants to local authorities, Highway planning and construction, and Community development block grants. On the other hand, non-formula grants consist mainly of project grants which provide funding for speci…c projects (such as fellowships, scholarships, research grants, training grants, planning and construction grants) for …xed or known periods.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 we verify that the results obtained by using CFFR data (available from 1983) are very similar to those previously obtained by using data from the Statistical Abstract. We then compare formula and non-formula grants starting from the standard speci…cation without P OP IN D. From columns 3 and 4 it is clear that a small state advantage only appears for formula grants. The short-run marginal e¤ect of population in the case of formula grants is almost seven times larger than that of non-formula grants. The long-run marginal e¤ect is ten times larger. These coe¢ cients are statistically signi…cant at a 5% level for formula grants and very far from statical signi…cance for non-formula grants.
Column 5 shows that these results are not robust to introducing P OP IN D. In other words, the small state advantage that seems to characterize formula grants can be attributed in large part to population dynamics, as con…rmed by the strong statistical signi…cance of P OP IN D in the formula grant regression. P OP IN D is instead only weakly statistically signi…cant (10% level) for non-formula programs and displays a substantially smaller coe¢ cient.
It remains quite possible that a small state advantage is present for some speci…c programs within our broadly de…ned spending categories, in particular for grants. As discussed in the Introduction, several studies make a convincing case in that direction. However, not …nding a strong e¤ect on the large aggregates implies that the overall magnitude of this e¤ect is con…ned to some particular or small program that it is compensated by countervailing forces in other programs.
Our conclusion from this analysis of broad spending aggregates is in line with our previous …ndings: separating scale and change e¤ects is important, since population dynamics matters for the allocation of federal spending. Population change and scale play di¤erent roles in di¤erent spending aggregates. Population dynamics is an important predictor of spending di¤erentials across states when we consider grants. On the other hand, small states enjoy a substantial advantage in the allocation of defense spending.
Conclusions
In this paper we have reconsidered the small state advantage hypothesis by analyzing data on the allocation of the US federal budget over the period . We have focused in particular on the limits of the standard econometric speci…cation and on the interpretation of its coe¢ cients to reach the conclusion that, while small states enjoy an advantage in the allocation of the budget, a substantial advantage is also provided by having a slow population dynamics. Hence, the size of the states does not uniquely de…ne a dividing line between their interests. When population dynamics is taken into account, small but fast growing states may end up on the same side of large and fast growing ones. The same is true for large and small, but slow growing states alike. In short, population dynamics is an important predictor of federal budget allocations: small but fast growing states lose funds to large but slow growing ones.
A small state advantage may occur because of the economies of scale associated with some public programmes. In this case it should not raise much concern since spending di¤erentials would serve the purpose of equalizing welfare across states. A less benign interpretation, however, is that a small state advantage may occur because of di¤erentiated representation in the policy making process, particularly through Senate malapportionment. The standard measure of Senate overrepresentation is the number of senators per capita. This indicator, however, is perfectly correlated with the state population and therefore does not allow to separate the impact of overrepresentation from that of any other variable that might happen to be correlated with the population size of a state. Moreover the use of senators per capita in spending regressions that use longitudinal data and state …xed-e¤ects do not isolate the role of small state advantage (scale e¤ects like malapportionment or economies of scale) from that of population growth (change e¤ects for a given population size). When we include a pure "population change" variable in our estimations, we …nd that the population scale e¤ect is reduced by half and is mainly driven by defense spending. Our conclusion is that the impact of small state advantage on large spending programs has been substantially overestimated and that we need an alternative (or, at least, a complementary) explanation for the rather puzzling evidence accumulated by the abundant empirical literature on this issue.
Our analysis reveals that, once we disintagle scale and change e¤ects, fast growing states are disadvantaged in the allocation of the federal budget independently of their population size. This may in part be due to the di¢ culties of collecting and processing all the information necessary to guarantee to every state a fair share of the budget. However, even when such information is available, budgetary rules and formulas, whose determination is not isolated Understanding how budgetary provisions for speci…c items are negotiated within Congress when large population changes occur, and whether they are a¤ected by institutional and political features, such as committee representation, party politics and electoral considerations, are very fundamental questions that we leave for future investigation.
Appendix
Short and long run multipliers
Consider equation (1) in Section 3:
This speci…cation implies that the impact of the independent variables on spending is not transmitted in a single time period, but over a number of subsequent years. This assumption is captured in the literature by using the so-called distributed lag analysis (Koyck (1954); Jorgenson (1966) ). We use a very common lag structure, known as Koyck (1954) transformation, which assumes that the regression coe¢ cients decline geometrically over time. This means that (1 ) estimates the decline rate of the impact of the independent variables. The coe¢ cients of the regressors in equation (1) are short run multipliers, i.e. they capture the impact in a single time period. The long run multipliers can then obtained by dividing each short run multiplier by 1 minus the lag of the endogenous variable (Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981), p. 232) . In other terms, equation (1) can be written as:
On the RHS we have the short-run coe¢ cients. If < 1; then (??) converges to steady state and therefore we can write:
Hence, the long run equation can be written as:
where (1 ) and ( 
